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FORUM SHOPPING AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON LITIGATION
INVOLVING U.S. AND EUROPEAN
BUSINESSESt
Donald C. Dowling, Jr.tt

I.

INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

When U.S. lawyers say they practice "international law,"
they usually mean "international transactional law." These
lawyers help set up international deals. But just as domestic
business deals give rise to disputes that wind up in litigation,
international business deals which go sour often find their way
into tribunals such as courts and the arbitration process. A key
part of international law practice is resolving international
disputes.
U.S. lawyers, more so than their European counterparts,
draw a sharp distinction between transactional and litigation
practice. However, an understanding of international business
dispute resolution is essential for structuring successful international deals. You cannot set up a deal properly if you do not
plan for what will happen if the deal goes bad.
©1994 by Donald C. Dowling, Jr.
t This paper is based on the "Opening Dinner Address" the author made to
the American Association of Law Libraries "International Legal Transactions
Institute" in Seattle on July 5, 1994. This paper will appear as the opening
chapter in a forthcoming Oceana Publications book collecting papers from that
Institute.
tt Partner, Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio; adjunct professor at
the University of Cincinnati College of Law (teaching "European Union Law");
Vice-Chair, American Bar Association International Employment Law Committee.
A.B. 1982, University of Chicago; J.D. 1985, University of Florida. The author
thanks Nancy H. Dowling, Esq., Senior Counsel at The Procter & Gamble Co. for
assistance, and John B. Pinney, Esq., partner at Graydon, Head & Ritchey for guidance. For the opportunity which led to this paper the author is grateful to Nancy
Honig, Esq. (DIALOG Information Services, Inc.); Roberta I. Shaffer (Covington &
Burling Library); and Marilyn Raish (Columbia Law School Library).
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In fact, dispute issues are sometimes central elements to an
international deal. I recently worked with a U.S.-based company which had developed a cutting-edge technology unavailable outside the U.S. The client, which did not have a European
presence, negotiated with an Italian counterpart which enjoyed
a major European market share. The Italian counterpart
wanted to license the innovative U.S. technology and distribute
the resulting products throughout Europe. The relationship
had the makings of a classic "win-win" scenario: each party had
something the other wanted. The sticking point was enforcement, how to avoid disputes over compliance. The U.S. company had difficulty proposing a workable royalty licensing
arrangement, because all the sales information would be in the
hands of the Italian company, an arms-length competitor on the
other side of the Atlantic. The Americans were reluctant to disclose valuable trade secrets to a foreign competitor which would
be in a position to exploit the information for its own gain.
While the deal initially appeared simple, it ended up being virtually unworkable because the specter of disputes loomed too
large. The deal's weakness was the unavailability of a viable
dispute resolution mechanism.
This illustrates why transactional lawyers representing
U.S. companies with international business interests need to be
able to spot and address international dispute resolution issues.
This paper will examine those issues, raising them in their
broadest possible context and illustrating them with examples
from and reflections on my own experience. This is a practiceoriented discussion which has as its goal the examination of the
link between dispute resolution procedures and U.S. businesses'
transactions with Europe.'
1 This paper offers a "hypothesis-forming," as opposed to "hypothesis-testing," treatment of international litigation issues. See WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH, THE
PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 4-5 (1964); see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., General
Propositionsand Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard in the Conflict Between Individual PropertyRights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 353, 357 n. 30 (1985). Only a book-length treatment could
possibly flesh out the legal principles behind all the international litigation issues
discussed here. Currently, the two leading treatises attempting to do this by addressing the law of international litigation in U.S. courts are GARY B. BORN &
DAVID WESTIN,

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS,

TARY AND MATERIALS

(2d ed. 1992) and
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INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS: FORUM SELECTION, ARBITRATION
CLAUSES, AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND

EUROPEAN COURT PROCEDURES

When businesses in two different countries have a dispute
which leads to litigation, the first and probably most important
issue is forum selection, or "forum shopping." 2 Because international business disputes often center on contracts, the primary
issue governing international forum selection is the text of the
parties' contract. The secondary issue is the geographic location
of the party which files the litigation, and the location of its law
firm.
A.

ContractualForum Selection Provisions

Working a forum selection clause into an international contract is perhaps the most important example of how international litigation issues fit into international transactional
practice. The transaction lawyer who negotiated an original
contract and its forum selection clause often has a greater impact on the outcome of an after-arising dispute than does the
3
litigation attorney who ends up handling the case.
The drafter of a forum selection clause must distinguish
choice of law from choice of forum location, and must distinguish both of these from choice of forum type. Choice of law is
simply the choice of which legal system will govern the contract.
Usually this is the legal system of one of the parties's home
countries, 4 but the parties can also designate a third countries'
TERNATIONAL LITIGATION:

A

GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY

(1993).

2 "Forum selection" and "forum shopping" address the same thing; the difference is who is speaking. The party choosing the forum is engaged in "forum selection," while the party dragged into a forum against its will accuses its adversary of
"forum shopping."
3 See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas,
973 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1992) (enforcing contractual selection of Brazilian forum);
Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992) (enforcing contractual selection of British forum), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
See generally Michael F. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privatization
of Procedure," 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51 (1992). See also generally discussion infra
at part V.
4 On occasion, resolving international disputes pursuant to an arbitration
clause can involve applying the law of more than one legal system. Cf Comment,
The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in InternationalCommercialArbitration:
A Case.for ContractualDepe~age, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1991).
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legal system, or even a private legal structure which is not tied
to any one government. 5
Surprisingly, contract drafters often inadvertently truncate
the choice of forum location and choice of law issues designating
one without mentioning the other. Analytically, choice of forum
location is an issue entirely separate from choice of law. Often
as a means of compromise, parties which distinguish these issues will stipulate that one party's national law applies to a
contract, while the other party's national courts will serve as
6
the site for litigation arising out of the deal.
The third issue related to choice of law and choice of forum
location is choice of forum type. At its most basic, this is the
question of "to arbitrate or to litigate?"7 Deciding between arbi-

tration and litigation depends on many factors: a party's assessment at the transaction stage8 of who is most likely to initiate
proceedings in the event of a dispute; how trustworthy are the
courts in the respective parties' jurisdictions; and how enforceable a court award would be against the other side.
5 For example, parties from countries not signatory to the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods might nevertheless incorporate
the Convention as a term in their contracts. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668,
671 (1980) (available in foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). This Convention is a treaty which has 34 signatory countries (including the U.S. and European
Union member states Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Spain), but parties in non-signatory states can invoke the Convention by incorporation as a term in a contract.
6 Courts around the world generally respect contracting parties' right to stipulate that the law of a non-forum country will apply to a dispute within the forum.
See, e.g., citations supra at note 5. Usually courts require only that the country
chosen for its governing law have some rational connection to the deal. Thus, if a
U.S. company and a Spanish company enter a joint venture to be performed in
Germany, the parties' contract could safely designate the laws of the U.S., Spain,
or Germany. If, however, the parties decided to invoke Nigerian law, their selection likely would not stand up if challenged later in a court with a more logical
connection to the deal.
7 Actually this is an oversimplification, because alternative dispute resolution clauses often contain other options, including forms of mediation. Usually,
however, the final dispute resolution step will be arbitration. Cf Steven C. Nelson,
Alternatives to Litigation of InternationalDisputes, 23 INTL LAw. 187 (1989) (article discussing international dispute resolution "alternatives" devotes 11 pages
[193-203] to arbitration and less than 3 pages [204-06] to all other 'alternatives").
8 Theoretically, after a dispute arises the parties can jointly opt for arbitration, even if no arbitration clause had been worked into the contract at the transaction stage. In practice, however, this almost never happens.
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Common justifications for arbitration such as speed and
cost-savings are largely illusory in today's environment. The reality of scheduling international arbitrations, especially those
with panels of three arbitrators, can lead to delays similar to
those inherent in court proceedings. Also, complex business arbitrations involving U.S. parties can be as expensive as court
proceedings. I was recently involved in an international business arbitration in which the hearing ended up lasting more
than a month, and in which the pre-hearing discovery proceedings had been more elaborate than those in most internationalcontext court lawsuits. One of my partners spent two weeks flying all over the Far East taking depositions in a trip that ended
up covering more ground than Marco Polo's.
Yet international arbitration has two important advantages which keep it at the forefront of dispute resolution options
in international deals. First is neutrality. Arbitration is a natural middle ground: A foreign adversary's local courts usually
appear biased, and your country's courts usually appear just as
biased to your adversary. International arbitration associations
especially those not based in either party's country, generally do
not play favorites. Parties to a deal can also select both a site
and a language for an arbitration proceeding which favors
neither side.
Perhaps most important, arbitrations are, believe it or not,
more readily enforceable abroad than court awards. 9 As a practical matter, a U.S. party which gets a judgment in a U.S. court
against a European defendant which does not have sufficient
assets in the U.S. will end up re-litigating in a European court,
in order to get the Europeans to enforce the judgment against
the defendants' European assets. Enforcing an arbitration

9 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.IA.S. No. 6999, 330 U.N.T.S.
38, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (available in foreign law volume of Martindale Hubbell) (the 83
signatory countries include the U.S. and all European Union [EU] states except
Portugal); David Rivkin, 'InternationalArbitration,"chapter 9 in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990's 123, 124 (1991) ("international arbitration awards are
easier to enforce than foreign court judgments"); cf Ramona Martinez, "Recognition and Enforcement of InternationalArbitralAwards Under the U.N. Convention
of 1958: The 'Refusal' Provisions," 24 INT'L LAw. 487 (1990).

5
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award within a New York Convention country, on the other
hand, is much simpler. 10
B. Location of Party Bringing Dispute to the Forum, and of
its Law Firm

If no underlying contract unequivocally designates the forum before which the international dispute must be brought,
the most important factor governing choice of forum becomes
the geographic location of the party filing the action and the location of its law firm. This issue can start a "race to the courthouse" in those disputes where each party can articulate some
claim against the other.
When the claimant bringing the dispute is based in the
U.S. and has U.S. counsel, that party almost always favors U.S.
courts. The chief reason is the fabled "home court advantage.""
Although statistics are hard to come by, experience, both personal and by reading enough reported case decisions, shows
that judges in every country do indeed tend to favor local parties over foreigners. "Home court advantage" is a legitimate
factor to consider when selecting a forum.
However, this factor should not overwhelm the other issues
in play, especially when a U.S.-based company has a substantial presence in the adversary's forum, and is to that extent effectively local. There is a huge Toyota plant in the small
Kentucky town of Georgetown. Procter & Gamble has extensive
operations near Brussels, Belgium. Neither Toyota of Japan
nor U.S. Procter & Gamble would have to worry about getting
"home-towned" in, respectively, Kentucky or Belgian courts.
Additionally, a neutral court forum is available whenever parties from two countries are doing business in a third country.
A key choice of law factor is the applicable legal systems'
substantive laws governing the actual dispute. Too often U.S.
parties and their lawyers reflexively decide that U.S. law is in10 In fact, New York Convention arbitrations circumvent most of the problems
discussed in the rest of this paper.
11 Another important reason U.S. claimants favor U.S. courts is the higher
amount of damages frequently available. However, this is not as significant a factor in breach of contract litigation (as are so many business disputes), because U.S.
courts more strictly limit breach of contract damages than damages under other
legal theories.
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herently better for U.S. clients. But conceptually, every time
U.S. law differs from a foreign doctrine, there is a 50% chance
that the foreign rule will be better for the U.S. client. 12 An informed choice of law decision is therefore impossible before researching both legal systems' applicable rules. A knee-jerk
3
preference for U.S. law can be a real disservice to clients.'
Additionally, having the "home court advantage" and even
winning a judgment are meaningless, if the judgment will not
be enforceable against the defendant's assets. Too often, U.S.
parties and their lawyers maneuver for a U.S. court forum, even
when a U.S. judgment will ultimately prove worthless. I know
a U.S. born and trained lawyer acting as a legal consultant in
Salzburg, Austria, who limits his consulting practice to helping
enforce U.S. judgments throughout Europe. This consultant laments that he has seen too many cases where U.S. clients' lawyers have treated cases in U.S. courts against solvent European
defendants just like domestic cases. They focused on proving
liability and damages, but effectively ignored the international
litigation issues of transnational service of process, personal jurisdiction, and enforcement of judgments abroad, until it was
too late. U.S. parties and their lawyers too often expend substantial time and resources, - and sometimes even win multimillion dollar verdicts - but end up recovering nothing,
because the defendant's foreign assets prove unreachable. The
12

Legal rules almost always exist in isolation from party nationality.

Is U.S. businesses' (and lawyers') knee-jerk preference for a U.S. forum can

lead to illogical results. I once saw a draft of a form employment contract between
a U.S. based company with a U.K. office and its U.K. citizen employees working in
the U.K The draft, which contained non-compete provisions, called for U.S. law
and courts to adjudicate all disputes. But U.K. employment law (like that of most
countries, including the U.S.) cannot be opted out of; this contract was therefore
unenforceable, because key terms of the parties' relationship, such as minimum
wage, workplace safety, collective bargaining, sick leave, maternity pay, and severance pay, were necessarily governed by U.K. law. Further, designating a U.S. forum often makes little sense when the other party has no ties to, assets in, nor
reason to travel to the U.S. The employer in this scenario might have rather easily
convinced a U.S. court to award a default judgment after a litigated dispute arose,
such as for breach of the non-competition clause, and after the employee failed to
show up in the stateside court. But getting a U.I court to enforce the default
judgment would be another matter entirely. And a non-competition or non-solicitation injunction from a U.S. court would be toothless if an ex-employee were competing overseas. Also, if a U.K. ex-employee sued simultaneously on an
employment theory in a U.K. tribunal, the British forum would almost certainly
retain jurisdiction, notwithstanding the choice-of-U.S.-forum clause.
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lesson is that while having the "home court advantage" can indeed be important, a lawyer should not let that advantage lure
the client away from its real, ultimate goal: collecting a
judgment.
C. Discovery Is a CriticalDifference Between U.S. and
Foreign Procedure
A vast gulf separates U.S. pretrial procedures from those of
the rest of the world. Ironically, while U.S. business people
often complain about the expense of domestic U.S. litigation,
once an international dispute actually arises, these same American executives often feel more comfortable in U.S. courts precisely because they offer more elaborate pre-trial discovery
procedures. 14 Yet the very availability of broad U.S. discovery
gives rise to European businesses' healthy aversion to U.S.
courts.
When facing a forum selection decision, particularly one in
which you feel tempted to undo a European claimant's choice of
a European forum, try the exercise of looking at the litigation
process from the European viewpoint. According to one French
lawyer who is also admitted to practice in the U.S.:
U.S.-style procedural rules, the absence of which U.S. litigants tend to criticize in European courts, are precisely those considered to be the most outrageous by European litigants in U.S.
courts.
Europeans are wary of U.S. jury trials because of the wide
discrepancies in awards between [European] Community and
U.S. jurisdictions. In civil law countries, juries do not participate
in civil or commercial matters. 15
'4 A vivid example of this thinking (albeit from a U.S. Judge, not an executive)
is the surprising 1993 ruling from highly-respected U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals judge Richard Posner in Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d
425,430 (7th Cir. 1993), laterproc.32 F.3d 1175 (1994). This opinion allows litigation over a French warehouse fire to proceed in a U.S. court, notwithstanding the
intrinsically French nature of the dispute, because "[it does not] appear that the
Commercial Court of Lille [France] is equipped to resolve a massive document
case."
15 Patrick Thieffry, 'European Integration in Transnational Litigation,' 13
B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. Rsv. 339, 356-57 (1990). The point here is that a U.S. defendant to European court litigation should think hard before urging to a European tribunal that U.S. courts are more appropriate. This is particularly true
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INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS, FROM
SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF

JUDGMENT

Notwithstanding all the foregoing, quite often U.S. parties
to international deals end up litigating international disputes
in U.S. courts. While many aspects of these cases are identical
to domestic business litigation, certain key procedural issues
take on special importance in the international context, particularly service of process, personal jurisdiction, discovery, and enforcement of foreign judgments.
A.

Service of Process

Domestically, service of process is usually a relatively simple issue which paralegals and court personnel handle without
the need for much attention from lawyers. However, in international-context litigation, service of process is far more complex,
because service on a foreign defendant involves sovereignty and
international diplomacy. By effecting service abroad, the forum
country performs an act with legal effect inside the recipient
country's national borders. Service of U.S. process on European

parties requires special attention.
I recently worked on a case in which our client was an English defendant sued in a Tennessee federal court. A solid argument existed that the service of process was technically
improper, so we challenged it. But our Tennessee local counsel
asked us several times why we were expending so much legal
time, effort, and expense on a service of process issue likely to
be resolved against us. Indeed, because domestic service of process deficiencies are usually curable, domestic service technicalities often are not worth expensive collateral litigation.
However, the analysis is quite different in the foreign context.
Many U.S. judgments against foreign defendants have been
rendered unenforceable due to service of process defects established in foreign courts at the enforcement stage. Defendants
who neglect to preserve their service challenges at the outset
can later be held to have waived these potentially-dispositive
defenses.
when the claimant's ties to the particular European forum at issue are not substantially stronger than the U.S. defendant's.

9
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The first question regarding how to perfect service of process abroad is whether the defendant's country is one of the 30
signatories to the Hague Service Convention. 16 Each Hague
Service Convention country designates a "Central Authority,"
through which a party from abroad seeking service must transmit judicial documents. The country's Central Authority itself
takes care of service. This circumvents the diplomatic breachof-sovereignty concern. Under the Hague Service Convention,
the defendant's countries' own officials serve process, after find17
ing out what a foreign lawsuit is all about.
However, while the Convention is theoretically "mandatory" in signatory countries,' 8 there exist certain procedures
which effectively streamline the Convention and allow a few
simplified service routes entirely short-circuiting the Central
Authority. 19
16 The Convention on Service of Process of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 (available in foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). The
U.S. and all European Union member states except Ireland are signatories. As to
foreign service of U.S. process, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See generally HAGuE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
JUDICIAL AND ExTRAJuDicIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIL

(1992); Kenneth Reisenfeld, "Service of U.S. ProcessAbroad: A PracticalGuide to
Service Under the Hague Service Convention and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure," 24 INT'L LAW. 55 (1990).
17 A country's authorities can and sometimes do reject service of a foreign
complaint which violates internal public policy. In the context of Western Europe,
this is especially a concern with Switzerland, which, due to differences between
Swiss and U.S. policy, with some regularity rejects U.S. court pleadings. See, e.g.,
U.S. Department of State, "JudicialAssistance in Switzerland" (unpublished paper available from Department of State at (202) 647-6445).
18 Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
19 One such shortcut is international service of process by mail. Some Hague
countries (for example Canada and Pakistan) expressly allow international mail
service, via statements in their accessions to the convention itself. Others (for example Germany and the Czech Republic) expressly forbid it. An argument exists
that the Convention's § 10(a) authorizes mail service in the rest of the signatory
countries. Cf Note, "InternationalService of Process by Mail Under the Hague
Service Convention," 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 698 (1992). Other such shortcuts exist
due to various Hague signatories' pronouncements allowing service which does not
conform to the letter of the Convention. For example, although the texts of the
Convention and its accession statements do not say so, the United Kingdom allows
"any person in another Contracting State [to effect] service 'directly' [in the U..]
through a competent person other than a judicial officer or official, e.g. a solicitor."
Letter from W. Jones (U.K. Nationality and Treaty Dep't) to J.H.A. van Loon (Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law) (Sept. 11, 1980).
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Service of process in countries which have not ratified the
Hague Service Convention requires research into these countries' specific national laws. The usual procedure is to serve
"letters rogatory," which in this context means a formal request
for service to the proper foreign official. This procedure, which
must be followed in Switzerland, can take a lot of time and be
quite frustrating, as when foreign functionaries reject pleadings
due to technical or de minimus violations. The U.S. Department of State is helpful in researching foreign service matters
and it publishes detailed papers on specific topics like "Judicial
20
Assistance in Switzerland."
B.

Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction in international-context litigation,
like service of process, usually requires more attention than it
does in domestic lawsuits. Traditionally, under U.S. law the
legal analysis was effectively the same in both types of cases. In
order for a U.S. court to be able to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant had to have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum U.S. state to be consistent with the state's
"long-arm" statute and with the "due process" clause of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. federal courts adopt the service of process
law of the state in which they sit. Therefore, in U.S. federal
court lawsuits the issue traditionally came down to assessing a
foreign defendants' contacts with the particular U.S. forum
state. 21
To illustrate, if a U.S.-based plaintiff sued a French defendant in either Oklahoma federal or state court, the traditional
U.S. personal jurisdiction analysis would focus on whether the
French entity had sufficient "minimum contacts" with
Oklahoma. The French defendant's contacts with all the other
U.S. states and territories would, for the most part, be irrelevant. Frustrations would arise when a foreign defendant had
substantial contacts with the U.S. as a whole, but these con20 The State Department will assist researchers over the telephone at (202)
647-3445, and will provide copies of these unpublished papers on request. On letters rogatory generally, see 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1994).
21 An exception to this has always been those few federal statutes which have
national service of process provisions, and therefore apply a "national minimum
contacts" test to overseas defendants.

11

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 7:465

tacts were sufficiently spread out so that no one state or territory had enough "minimum contacts" to assert personal
jurisdiction under the Constitution or under any applicable
"long arm" statute.
Some argued that a "U.S. national contacts" analysis
should apply against foreign parties, at least in federal court
proceedings. But the authoritative case law never went this far.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has implied that when a defendant is foreign, U.S. plaintiffs should have to prove greater
"minimum contacts" with the forum state than in a domestic
22
proceeding.
This "traditional" analysis still applies in state court cases
and in federal court diversity lawsuits. But very recently, effective since December 1, 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have allowed that, as to "claims arising under federal law,"
personal jurisdiction exists over any foreign defendant who is
properly served, as long as "the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 23
This essentially creates a "U.S. national contacts" test in federal
question cases extending personal jurisdiction as far as the
Constitution allows.
C.

Discovery

Once a plaintiff establishes service of process and personal
jurisdiction in a U.S. court, the focus turns to discovery, the process by which each side has to show its opponent most of the
cards in its hand. The U.S. practice of broad pre-trial discovery
including depositions, physical examinations, site inspections,
document production, and interrogatories 2 4 is virtually unknown in the rest of the world. Even in common-law England,
pre-trial discovery is extremely limited and depositions are
rare. In fact, there are only a handful of court reporters based
22 Asahi Metal Ind. v. Sup. Ct. Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) ("The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm
of [U.S.] personal jurisdiction over national borders.... ."). But cf S&S Screw
Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); McCombs v. Cerco
Rentals, 622 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Service must be consistent with the qualifications
set out in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1).

24

See

FED.

R. CIv. P. 27-36.
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in London, and these stenographers subsist chiefly on work for
U.S. lawyers deposing British witnesses for U.S. lawsuits.
In civil law countries, including those of Continental Europe, discovery is far more limited than in the U.S.. Rather
than take each others' depositions, in Continental Europe parties submit briefs explaining their cases and attaching all of the
key documents. In Europe, judges, not lawyers, are fact-finders.
Documents are more important in trial than is oral testimony.
When a party to a U.S. lawsuit must take evidence abroad,
an initial inquiry is whether the foreign country is a signatory
to the Hague Evidence Convention. 25 More than 20 countries
(including the U.S.) have signed on to the Hague Evidence Convention, but three European Union member states - Belgium,
Ireland, and Greece - have not. The Hague Evidence Convention, like the Hague Service Convention, funnels requests for
judicial assistance through a national "Central Authority"
26
which each signatory country has designated.
For obtaining discovery in non-Hague Evidence Convention
Countries, research into local law is especially important. 27 In
some countries, including Switzerland, taking a deposition is a
criminal act, because it threatens national sovereignty by forcing a domestic citizen to appear and testify on penalty of a foreign country's perjury laws. There are stories of lawyers who,
25 Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (available in
foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). For comment on this Convention, see,
e.g., Darrell Prescott & Edwin Alley, "Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague
Convention," 22 INT'L LAw. 939 (1988).
26 However, the Hague Evidence Convention is not mandatory, so parties can
take discovery through other routes. See Societ6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); Gary Born & Scott Hoing, Comity.
and the Lower Courts: Post-AdrospatialeApplications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 IN'L LAW. 393 (1990); Joseph Griffin & Mark Bravin, 'Beyond Adrospatile: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery Provisions of the Restatement (Third)
and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 25 INT'L
LAw. 331 (1991). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (depositions in foreign countries); 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1994) (letters rogatory); 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1994) (subpoena
of person in foreign country).
27 Here again the U.S. State Department can be an invaluable research
source, via its series of relevant papers, including "Obtaining Evidence Abroad,"
"Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters," and country-specific reports such as "Judicial Assistance in Switzerland,"
and through its telephone assistance. See supra notes 19, 22.
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ignorant of this, found themselves led out of deposition confer28
ence rooms in handcuffs!
The reciprocal issue, getting discovery in the U.S. for European court proceedings, is seldom problematic. A U.S. statute
offers broad assistance. 2 9 Since U.S. discovery is broader than
is discovery in Europe, U.S. courts rarely find their foreign
counterparts' information requests unreasonable.
D. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Before suing a party who resides abroad, a claimant must
consider the location of the defendants' assets and craft an appropriate strategy. Many foreign-based corporations have sufficient assets in the U.S. to render collection abroad a non-issue.
But when investigation reveals a defendants' assets are or can
quickly be moved abroad, the plaintiffs' litigation strategy from
the outset must account for the inevitability of having to enforce
any successful U.S. judgment abroad. 30 When arbitration is not
an option, often the enforcement factor will militate strongly toward suing abroad, on the defendant's home turf. The benefits
of "home court advantage" and enhanced remedies available in
U.S. litigation, such as treble and punitive damages, are illusory if the defendants' jurisdiction will not enforce U.S. judg3
ments which include these types of damages. '
28 See supra text at part III(A). Note that because discovery is so radically
different in foreign countries, even when a party to a U.S. lawsuit is entitled to
take evidence abroad (through the Hague Evidence Convention or through letters
rogatory), the foreign authorities may well impose conditions which are, by U.S.
standards, bizarre. For example, a foreign magistrate, not a U.S. lawyer, may do
the questioning, and the magistrate may summarize testimony in a report, rather
than allow a verbatim transcript.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994).
30 See generally Werner Ebke & Mary Parker, "ForeignCountry Money-Judgments andArbitralAwards and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the U.S.: A Conventional Approach," 24 INT'L LAw. 21 (1990).
31 For example this is the case in Switzerland and, often, Germany. See Martin Bernet & Nicholas Ulmer, "Recognitionand Enforcement of ForeignCivil Judgments in Switzerland," 27 INT'L LAw. 317, 326-29 (1993); Hartwin Bungert,
"EnforcingU.S. Excessive and Punitive Damages Awards in Germany," 27 INT'L
LAW. 1075 (1993). For a collection of sources on the recognition and enforcement of
U.S. judgments outside the U.S., see Robert Lutz, "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, PartII: A Selected Bibliography on Enforcement of U.S. Judgments in Foreign Countries," 27 Ir'L LAw. 1029 (1993). See generally INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGMENT DEBTORS (Dennis Campbell ed., 1994); INTERNA-
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A claimant who must enforce a judgment abroad has to win
twice, once in the U.S. court and once in collateral enforcement
litigation on the defendant's home turf. On occasion, a foreign
defendant will even devise a strategy in U.S. litigation which
relies on its winning at home at the enforcement level. In one
U.S. federal court lawsuit, a Swiss company which manufactures a consumer product well-known in the U.S. found itself
sued stateside by its American distributor. The Swiss lawyers
determined that their company would not be held subject to
U.S. jurisdiction under Swiss law principles. However, under
U.S. law, a U.S. court was very likely to (and ultimately did)
exercise personal jurisdiction. Because its assets were all in
Europe, the Swiss company decided to challenge jurisdiction
and service of process in the U.S. federal court. After losing that
challenge, it planned simply to stop defending the case. The
theory was that a U.S. default judgment would be worthless if
the plaintiff could not get it enforced in Switzerland. The Swiss
lawyers were that confident that a Swiss court would indeed reopen the jurisdiction issue (given that the company had preserved the point by challenging jurisdiction in the U.S. proceeding)32 and would ultimately decide, under Swiss law, that no
U.S. jurisdiction had existed.
The reciprocal enforcement-of-judgment issue is the question of how to enforce a European-rendered judgment in the
U.S. against an American defendant whose assets are stateside.
When a European court has rendered such a judgment, the applicable law governing enforcement is the law of the U.S. state
in which the defendant holds assets. 33 Many U.S. states have
adopted the "Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act."34 This model act which seeks to bring all U.S. states' laws
TIONAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

(Gregory Paley ed.,

1994).
32 A defendant who "objects to jurisdiction" in a proceeding outside of Switzerland "will not, under Swiss principles, be deemed to have submitted to foreign jurisdiction." Bernet & Ulmer, supra note 31, at 323.
33 For a collection of sources on the recognition and enforcement in the U.S. of
foreign country judgments, see Robert E. Lutz, "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, PartI: A Selected Bibliography on U.S. Enforcement of Judgments Rendered Abroad," 27 INT'L LAw. 471 (1993).
34 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962), codified at, for e.g., Omo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90.94 (1994). See Alan Sorkowitz, "EnforcingJudgments Under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act," 37 PRAc. LAw. 57 (July 1991).
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into conformity with prevailing internationally-accepted enforcement principles, contains exceptions rendering judgments

unenforceable when they violate a U.S. state's public policy, and
when they were obtained by fraud. Service of process is another
key issue under the Uniform Act. A U.S. defendant who was
not properly served in the foreign action can escape enforcement in the U.S.35 A reciprocity provision in the Act requires
that the country from which the judgment comes similarly respect U.S. judgments.
IV.

FORUM SELECTION WITHIN EUROPE

When a U.S. party finds itself in a dispute with a European,
the initial forum selection issue is usually "U.S. versus Europe."
When U.S. courts win out, the question turns to which U.S.
court to select, state or federal, and in which state. When the
European forum wins out, forum analysis can turn to the issue
of which European court and country to select.
Each European Union member state3 6 has its own unique
court system, over which exists the European Community
35 See generally Ronald Brand, 'Enforcement of ForeignMoney-Judgments in
the U.S.: In Search of Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance," 67 NOME DAME
L. REV. 253 (1991).
3 The European Union (which is for most practical purposes synonymous
with the older terms "European Community" and "European Common Market") is
a unique, often-amended treaty which superimposes a quasi-federalist governmental structure over the legal systems of its signatory "member states." For
overviews of the EU structure, see, e.g., LuciE A. CARSWELL & XAVIER DE SARRAO,
LAw & BusINEss IN THE EuRoPEAN SINGLE MARKEr, chaps. 1-3 (1993); DESMOND
DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
chaps. 7-10 (1994); EURoPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET, chaps. 1, 23 (Ralph Folsom et al.
eds., 1993); and Jean Thieffry, Philip Van Doom & Simon Lowe, "The Single European Market: A Practitioner'sGuide to 1992," 12 B.C. INT'L COMP & L. REV. 357
(1989). This author has written about other aspects of EU law in Donald C. Dowling, Jr., 'Employment Matters and the Social Charter," chapter 19 in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AFrER 1992 (Folsom, Lake & Nanda eds., 1993); Nancy E. Honig
& Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "How to Handle Employment Issues in EuropeanDeals,"
13 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 3 (Spring 1994); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., 'EC Employment
Law After Maastricht: Continental Social Europe?," 27 INT'L LAw. 1 (1993) reprinted as chapter 16.1 in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CommNmrrY LAw (W. Hancock ed.,
1994); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "HowDoes Europe Regulate Power Within Its Corporations?," 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601 (1992) (book review); Donald C. Dowling,
Jr., 'LEuropaSociale: Il Punto di Vista delle Imprese Multinazionali USA," 25-26
INDUSTRIA E SINDACATO 16 (1991) (Rome); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., 'Worker Rights
in the Post-1992EC: What 'SocialEurope' Means to U.S.-Based MultinationalEm-
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Court of Justice, based in Luxembourg, and the European Community Court of First Instance. 37 Certain other disputes also
get heard by the European Community Commission, an administrative body. But these three European tribunals only adjudicate certain matters of European Union law. Much European
Union law gets adjudicated in the member state courts under
the "direct effect" doctrine. The vast majority of disputes between U.S. and European business never make their way before
these three European Union tribunals.
A unique treaty called the Brussels Convention 38 controls

questions of jurisdiction among the courts of the European
Union member states. If you win a lawsuit in Denmark against
a Greek defendant, it is the Brussels Convention which will allow you to execute your judgment in Greece. The raison d'6tre
of the European Union is to encourage the free movement of
goods, services, and capital among the member states. The idea
behind the Brussels Convention is the concomitant goal of encouraging the free movement of judgments. 39
Technically the Brussels Convention is not a European
Union instrument; it is an entirely separate international
treaty which exists as a parallel universe to the European
Union treaties themselves. But all the European Union member states ratified the Brussels Convention, and it is adjudi40
cated by the European Union's Court of Justice.
ployers," 11 Nw. J. INTrL L. & Bus. 564 (1991), reprinted as chapter 16 in European Economic Community Law (W. Hancock ed., 1992).
37 For a non-technical discussion of how the two European Union courts allocate jurisdiction between themselves and with the member states' courts, see, e.g.,
Dinan, supra note 36, at 295-310.
38 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1969 O.J. (C-97) 2; J.L.M. 229 (1968)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention].
39 Because the Brussels Convention effectively allows free enforcement of
judgments among member states, some U.S. litigators have considered seeking enforcement of a U.S. judgment in the friendliest possible EU member state, for example England, and then invoking the Brussels Convention to enforce that
"English" judgment in a less-friendly member state where the defendant has assets, say Germany, when there is a treble or punitive damage component to the
original U.S. award. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40 A proposed parallel treaty, the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Between the Member
States of the European Communities and of the European Free Trade Association,
September 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L-319)9, exists to address enforcement of judgments between EU and European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA] member states.
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The Brussels Convention's Article 26 states "a judgment
given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the other
Contracting States without any special procedure being required."41 However, even inter-European Union judgments will
not be respected if: they are contrary to public policy in the enforcing state; there was a service of process problem and a default judgment was entered; or the judgment is irreconcilable
42
with a prior judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION:

PROCEDURAL DisPuTE RESOLUTION ISSUES

OFTEN HAVE CRITICAL SUBSTANTVE EFFECT

In order effectively to represent a client in an international
transaction, those who put deals together need to focus on all
the dispute resolution issues which can come into play, even
though the team structuring the deal hopes for future cooperation, not dissention. The best international transactions are
structured so that disputes which pop up later resolve themselves. From the point of view of a transactional lawyer, this
resolution should, of course, be to the client's own advantage.
Not long ago my law firm had the good fortune to be involved in such a case. Our client was a Dutch machine manufacturer which had sold a large piece of equipment to a
customer in Washington state. The sale documents had contained a boilerplate clause saying that all disputes would be resolved via arbitration at the Hague, in Holland - a home court
advantage for our client. At the time of the transaction, the
Washington customer, focusing on getting the equipment and
not on fighting over it later, said nothing about this fine-print
forum selection provision. When a dispute did arise, the customer sued in Washington federal court. We immediately
raised the boilerplate arbitration clause by motion, moving to
dismiss on arbitrability. After a hearing on just the arbitrability issue, the court ruled it had to uphold the clause, so it
dismissed the case. The U.S. plaintiff, no longer able to play on
Id. However, the Lugano Convention has never been implemented. Now that
most EFTA nations are being admitted into the EU, perhaps it never will be.
41 Brussels Convention, supra note 38, at art. 26.
42 Brussels Convention, supra note 38.
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its home court, gave up, without filing for a Hague arbitration!
Careful attention to dispute resolution up front, at the transaction stage, ended up winning a later-arising litigated dispute.
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